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Several major United States retailers have suffered large-scale thefts of payment 
card information as the result of intrusions against point-of-sale systems (smart 
cash registers). Point-of-sale attacks present a growing threat and can constitute 
a homeland-security problem due to a trans-national cyber crime element. This 
thesis presents results of a survey of point-of-sale intrusions that reached at least 
the start of criminal investigation. The survey showed that attacks were generally 
quite simple, and predominantly involved guessing passwords and subsequent 
installation of keyboard loggers. That suggests that countermeasures can be 
relatively simple although they must overcome organizational inertia. Our 
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On December 19, 2013, the Target department store chain, the second-
largest retailer in the United States, announced in a press release that hackers 
had exfiltrated approximately forty million credit and debit-card numbers, from 
November 27 through December 15, 2013 (Target, 2013). The criminals 
transferred the stolen data to a server in Russia (Raff, 2014). 
Since the initial news, there have been numerous postings and 
announcements from Target, security blogs, and security research companies 
regarding the intrusion. Although the specific details are still unfolding as of the 
writing of this thesis, there has been significant attention focused on Target’s 
point-of-sale terminals, the locations where customers physically swipe their 
credit or debit cards for payment. 
The Target network intrusion, and the subsequent news that the Nieman 
Marcus retail chain suffered a similar hack (Krebs, 2013; Krebs, 2014, January 
10), has brought national attention to point-of-sale systems and the potential for 
significant fraud due to compromised payment card information. On February 04, 
2014, high-level executives from Target and Nieman Marcus prepared written 
testimonials in advance of several congressional hearings on retail data 
breaches the week of February 05, 2014 (Associated Press, 2014; United States 
Senate, 2014).  
While the Target data breach attracted significant national attention due to 
the magnitude of the data losses, the compromise of credit and debit card 
numbers due to network intrusions of point-of-sale systems has been a problem 
for several years. Trustwave, an incident response and security research 
company, identified point-of-sale system malware as far back as July 2008 
(Percoco, Sheppard, & Ilyas, n.d.). Much of the discussion among Congress, the 
Federal Trade Commission, the retail industry, and security experts has focused 




identification number (PIN) system used in other parts of the world, and whether 
Congress should pass a federal data breach notification law that would require 
businesses to notify customers if card data had been compromised (Hans, 2014). 
These two suggestions—a Chip-and-PIN system and a federal data 
breach law—will do nothing to address the question of why hackers so easily 
breach point-of-sale systems. Chip-and-PIN systems will make it more difficult for 
criminals to manufacture counterfeit payment cards, and therefore may remove 
some of the incentive for criminals to attempt point-of-sale system intrusions, but 
moving to such a system will not prevent point-of-sale intrusions themselves. 
Although law enforcement agents and forensic specialists are still investigating 
the Target intrusion, the latest public information suggests that hackers infiltrated 
the Target network using network credentials stolen from a company contracted 
by Target to manage the latter’s climate control (HVAC) systems (Krebs, 2014 
February 6).  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Congressional testimony concerning the recent data breaches against 
Target and Neiman Marcus has brought much needed focus and attention on the 
problem of payment card security throughout the retail industry (Douglas, 2014). 
Members of Congress and corporate executives have suggested migrating 
toward a more secure PIN-and-Chip card system and passing Federal legislation 
concerning data breach notifications and consumer protection (Associated Press, 
2014). Data-breach notification laws have their own intrinsic value, but if stronger 
information security practices reduce the number and impact of point-of-sale 
system intrusions, there will be less of a need for data-breach notification laws. 
B. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
The Department of Homeland Security, in its Quadrennial Homeland 
Security Review Report, listed several departmental goals (Department of 




Resilient Cyber Environment” and “Promote Cybersecurity Knowledge and 
Innovation”. Within the Department of Homeland Security, the United States 
Secret Service shares jurisdictional authority to investigate network intrusions 
against point-of-sale systems (18 U.S. Code § 1030). The U.S. Secret Service 
works closely with private forensics firms and other law enforcement agencies to 
develop forensic knowledge and techniques related to point-of-sale system 
breaches. By analyzing criminal investigations into point-of-sale systems, this 
information will equip the Department of Homeland Security to improve public 
awareness efforts toward securing point-of-sale systems. We have an additional 
goal of advancing the discussion of and research into forensic tools and 
techniques in support of point-of-sale system criminal investigations. 
C. LIMITATIONS 
In conducting research and analysis on the subject of point-of-sale system 
data breaches, we encountered several limitations: 
 There were no reliable statistics regarding how many criminal 
intrusions have taken place targeting retail point-of-sale systems. 
For similar reasons, there are no specific data regarding actual 
fraud losses to financial institutions, retail establishments, and 
consumers. 
 To protect the integrity of active investigations and the privacy of 
victims, only aggregated data will be discussed. Specific case 
studies will be limited to those with publicly released judicial 
documents. 
 In some cases used to supply the aggregate data, specific items 
such as the name and characteristics of malware used were not 
available. In some cases, for example, the victim or point-of-sale 
system vendor performed a cleanup of the system thus eliminating 
evidence. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will evaluate several notable point-of-sale data breaches based 
on publicly available information, including publicized attacks against the Subway 




Marcus. It will examine open-source documents illustrating the trans-national 
criminal element of online card data compromises. Finally, it will reference a 
variety of data breach studies, both point-of-sale-specific and not, from major 
forensic firms including Trustwave and Verizon. 
To develop insight into individual data breaches, this thesis examined 
forty-two active and recently closed criminal investigations by agents of the U.S. 
Secret Service. Our goal in performing these case studies was to determine if 
there were specific trends related to the nature of the point-of-sale system 
intrusion (i.e., how did the hackers break in), the hacking exploits or malicious 
code used, the duration of the attacks, and how the intrusion was discovered. 
Finally, as a model for a potential mitigation strategy for the problem of 
point-of-sale system intrusions, the thesis gives specific recommendations for 
securing systems and maintaining good security practices. It also reviews an 
ongoing successful federal crime-prevention program that may serve as a model 
















II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Point-of-sale systems typically include one or more terminals, a back-of-
house server, and a connection to the Internet or to a corporate network. The 
terminals usually consist of a standalone card terminal (common in supermarkets 
and department stores, for example) connected to a computer, or a card terminal 
connected to a touch-screen monitor (common in restaurants and bars, for 
example). These terminals read the track data from cards and forward the 
information to a back-of-house server. The back-of-house server collects card 
data from the merchant’s terminals and relays it to a payment processor for card 
approval or denial. Larger corporations may use a different configuration in which 
card data is sent through a corporate office before it reaches a payment 
processor. Point-of-sale systems include card reading hardware (i.e., the 
terminals) and software to read data and forward the data to card processors. 
Most point-of-sale systems for small and medium-sized businesses use standard 
Microsoft Windows desktops to run the terminals, and use a Windows server as 
the platform for the back-of-house server. Figure 1 illustrates two common point-
of-sale system topologies, the first for a small business and the second for a 




















A. POINT OF SALE SYSTEMS AND ATTACKS 
Point-of-sale system attacks are new in terms of published books and 
professional literature, but there has been some prior work assessing specific 
threats. 
Hizver and Chiueh performed an analysis of point-of-sale systems 
software processes on a Windows server in a virtual environment (Hizver & 
Chiueh, 2012). The authors showed that once the memory locations of the 
processes were located, a random access memory tool could simply search for 
ASCII strings consistent with credit card numbers; that is, 13- or 16-digit strings 
beginning with certain digits (e.g., a 4 for a Visa or a 5 for a MasterCard). This in 
fact is the premise behind memory scraping malicious code. 
Venter et al describe a suite of malware files that currently exist in the wild 
including “ramsys32.sys,” a malware controller application known as 
“loader.exe,” and a dynamic link library called “searcher.dll” (Ventner, Sheppard, 
& Percoco, 2010). The authors explain how these three malicious files work 
together to scan for and copy out card track data once such data appears in 
memory. “Searcher.dll” appears in numerous cases examined in Chapter IV. 
Bowles et al. propose a method for exploiting point-of-sale system PIN 
entry devices (Bowles, Cuthbert, & Stewart, 2005). Their analysis focuses on 
physical attacks against such devices, as for example inserting a hardware or 
software sniffer inside the point-of-sale and PIN hardware. The Michaels craft 
store chain suffered such an attack against their physical point-of-sale and PIN 
devices in 2011 (Krebs, 2011). 
Many small businesses rely on a point-of-sale system vendor to perform 
technical updates or repairs. In order to provide real-time customer support, 
especially during non-business hours, some point-of-sale system vendors install 
a remote desktop environment (RDE) product on the business’s point-of-sale 




of common network ports associated with well-known remote desktop products. 
For example, PC Anywhere typically runs on TCP port 5631 or 65301 for data, 
and UDP port 22 or 5632 for status transmissions. Hackers will scan IP 
addresses connected to restaurants or businesses, looking for indications that 
those ports are open. Port scanning is a long established technique, and the pre-
eminent tool for port scanning is Nmap. There are many options available for the 
Nmap tool (Lyon, 2008). 
B. NONVOLATILE FORENSIC ARTIFACTS 
For point-of-sale system intrusions, investigators focus on a variety of 
volatile and non-volatile forensic clues. In general, volatile artifacts are those 
elements that are in main memory and will disappear if the network connection is 
lost or if the affected machine is restarted. Non-volatile forensic artifacts are 
those items that are typically written to disk, such as a file or Windows Registry 
key. In general, Secret Service best practices call for agents to acquire both 
kinds of forensic data- if the circumstances of the investigation allow for such 
collection. 
In non-volatile forensic data collection, an important focal point is the 
Windows Registry, which is a large collection of user and system settings. Many 
types of malware used in point-of-sale system intrusions leave or modify one or 
more identifiable keys in the Windows Registry. 
Carvey proposes a method for analyzing volatile, semi-volatile, and 
archived information on Microsoft Windows-based computers (Carvey, 2012). A 
number of Carvey’s techniques, for example acquiring and analyzing the 
Windows Registry hives from the live machine, are particularly useful for 
analyzing compromised Windows based point-of-sale terminals (the terminals 
where employees place orders and swipe cards for processing) and back-of-
house servers (typically a server that transfers card data and approval 




2011). Many forms of malware used in point-of-sale system intrusions leave 
specific traces in Registry keys, and Carvey’s techniques for Registry hive 
acquisition and analysis work well with these types of investigations. 
The most common approach to malware detection relies on identifying 
suspicious files by comparing the checksum (many-to-one mapping) of a 
questionable file against a list of known checksums linked to known malware. 
Comparing checksums is a simple task that can be performed with a variety of 
command line or graphical user interface tools. Since most point-of-sale systems 
use standard commercial software, including underlying operating systems, 
checksum verification tools can easily be installed and configured on point-of-
sale systems to monitor for malicious code with known checksum values. This 
technique is limited against new (zero-day) exploits for which checksums of the 
malicious code will not be available. 
Ligh et al. propose a number of additional techniques for analyzing files, 
Windows registry keys, and memory captures for indications of malicious code 
infection (Ligh et al. 2011). Their analysis of malware-laced documents (e.g., 
Adobe pdf files, Microsoft Office documents) is beneficial due to the fact that 
some point-of-sale system users conduct non-business Internet activities (e.g., 
checking email or browsing Web sites) on point-of-sale terminals, and thus are 
potential targets for phishing or other forms of social engineering.  
C. VOLATILE FORENSIC ARTIFACTS 
Common examples of volatile data are the contents of random-access 
memory (RAM), running processes, and active network information. Information 
regarding active processes and network information can be obtained from a 
series of simple command line tools (e.g., the netstat command), but memory 
(RAM) capture files may include additional information, such as hidden 




Okolica and Peterson propose a method for analyzing Windows based 
memory samples for information regarding, among other things, running 
processes (Okolica & Peterson, 2010). Carvey and Ligh demonstrate the value of 
studying active processes on a potentially infected or compromised Windows 
machine (Carvey 2012; Ligh et al., 2011). Point-of-sale system malicious code 
may initiate one or more running processes on the infected system (hidden or 
not), therefore these techniques may assist investigators.  
Hejazi et al describe a method of “application fingerprinting” to extract 
information beyond string pattern matching and plain text information such as 
processes (Hejazi, Talki & Debbabi 2009). Furthermore, they explain a method 
for studying the operating system call stack and stack frame to search for useful 
information in a memory capture. This method could be useful to look for 
indications of malicious code not easily identifiable through simple string 
searches. 
Beverly et al explain a method for extracting network packet data from 
memory samples (Beverly, Garfinkel, & Cardwell, 2011). Their work describes 
how network packet artifacts, such as Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, can be 
recovered, even after network connections have been terminated. This technique 
could prove valuable if stolen card data has recently been exfiltrated (either 
manually or through an automated process) by possibly yielding IP addresses or 
Domain Name Service information.  
D. NETWORK-BASED ARTIFACTS 
A survey done for this thesis will suggest that most point-of-sale system 
intrusions use fairly simple attack methods and forms of malware. Attacks 
generally make little or no effort to hide or disguise the file names or process 
names of their malicious code. Nevertheless, it is useful to study network packet 
captures of compromised point-of-sale terminals to analyze indications of 




offer few opportunities for log-file analysis or forensic evaluation of routers and 
network switches, there are useful methods involving them. 
Chappell provides a discussion of Wireshark, the most popular tool for 
acquiring and analyzing network packets (Chappell, 2012). She suggests several 
security related scenarios in which network packet captures would be useful for 
network forensics, such as when an infected machine sends out unauthorized 
data or attempts to contact a command and control server. In some forms of 
point-of-sale attacks criminals will establish an automated file transfer protocol 
(FTP) or simple mail transport protocol (SMTP) service that will automatically 

















III. POINT OF SALE SYSTEM BREACHES: A HOMELAND 
SECURITY PERSPECTIVE 
A. PAYMENT CARD SYSTEM COMPROMISES: A HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
Despite the significant number of credit and debit-card accounts 
compromised from the Target point-of-sale system intrusion, it is not the largest 
payment-card data breach in history. That dubious distinction belongs to 
Heartland Payment Systems, a payment processing company in New Jersey. In 
January 2009, Heartland Payment Systems disclosed that hackers had broken 
into their network and stolen millions of credit-card numbers (Acohido, 2009). In a 
federal indictment against the three defendants, the United States government 
declared that hackers had compromised 130 million credit and debit card 
numbers (U.S. v. Gonzalez). Prior to the Heartland Payment systems breach, the 
largest card theft targeted TJX, parent company of clothing retailers TJ Maxx and 
Marshalls. Over an eighteen-month period in 2005 and 2006, hackers infiltrated 
the TJX point-of-sale network and garnered approximately 94 million account 
numbers (Berg, Freeman, & Schneider, 2008). 
A study by FICO, a company that specializes in financial analytics and 
credit scores, identified point-of-sale fraud as far back as 2001 (FICO, 2010). In 
2005, researchers from the Electronic Warfare Association-Canada published a 
paper describing physical attack scenarios against magnetic stripe-based point-
of-sale system terminals (Bowles, Cuthbert, & Stewart, 2005). In 2008, the 
incident response company Trustwave published a report indicating that point-of-
sale system hackers were shifting tactics away from data at rest attacks (e.g., 
SQL Injection attacks or “smash and grab” attacks, in which an intruder breaks 
into a network to steal one or more flat files containing payment-card data) 
toward data-in-memory attacks. Trustwave reasoned that as fewer organizations 
stored payment card data, and such data was encrypted from the time of the 




only real opportunity to obtain unencrypted card data was during the brief period 
of time when the card data was in plain text in the point-of-sale terminal’s random 
access memory (Trustwave, 2008). Indeed, “memory scraping,” which refers to 
the act of capturing card data as it briefly enters an unencrypted state in a point-
of-sale terminal’s random access memory, is the attack of choice for hackers 
who target data in transit. Trustwave identified memory scraping as the dominant 
method of capturing card data in its most recent analysis of payment-card system 
compromises, the 2013 Global Security Report (Percoco et al., 2013). 
B. RECENT HIGH-PROFILE POINT-OF-SALE SYSTEM COMPROMISES 
On December 19, 2013, the Target department store chain announced in 
a press release that hackers compromised approximately 40 million credit and 
debit card numbers in a three-week period (Target, 2013, December 19). Target 
released another statement the next day assuring its customers that only credit 
and debit card track data (name, card number, expiration date, and CVV) had 
been stolen. Target emphasized that PIN codes for debit-card transactions had 
not been compromised (Target, 2013, December 20). Target added that 
customers who shopped at their online site (i.e., target.com) were not affected, 
suggesting that the intruders compromised the point-of-sale system, the 
mechanism that processes cards for in-store purchases. On January 12, 2014, 
Target CEO Gregg Steinhafel confirmed that the data breach included malware 
infections of point-of-sale terminals (Quick, 2014). In February 2014, 
investigators focused on Fazio, a company Target contracted for HVAC work. In 
a publicly released statement, Fazio claimed that they were also victims of the 
Target data breach, and that Fazio followed industry best practices for 
information security (Fazio, n.d.; Krebs, 2014, February 12). 
Less than a month after Target disclosed its large-scale data breach, 
representatives from the Neiman Marcus retail chain announced that the high-
end retailer had also suffered a network intrusion, compromising 1.1 million credit 




revealed that their point-of-sale system was compromised over a period of more 
than three months (Katz, 2014). According to a Reuters report, malware known 
as a “memory scraper” was used in both the Target and Neiman Marcus attacks 
(Finkle & Hosenball, 2014). 
The exact potential fraud losses for these two data breaches, affecting 
over forty-one million credit and debit cards, would be difficult to determine, as 
each cardholder has a distinct credit limit or debit balance. If we use the United 
States Sentencing Commission standard of $500 loss per card (United States 
Sentencing Commission, 2013), then the Target and Neiman Marcus breaches 
alone could yield over twenty billion dollars in fraud.  
C. RECENT PUBLIC DISCOURSE OVER POINT-OF-SALE DATA 
COMPROMISES 
Even after fifteen years of publicity surrounding point-of-sale system 
compromises, including high-profile criminal arrests and major intrusions against 
TJX and Heartland Payment Systems, the recent Target and Neiman Marcus 
data breaches generated significant public attention. In February 2014, Congress 
held hearings on the Target and Neiman Marcus intrusions. The focus of the 
hearings, based on testimony of retail executives and comments and questions 
by members of Congress, centered on the discussion of whether and when the 
United States retail and financial sectors should move from magnetic-stripe cards 
to PIN-and-chip based cards. While a move to PIN-and-chip cards will make the 
counterfeiting of credit and debit cards more difficult, it will not prevent point-of-
sale system intrusions themselves since it does not affect memory 
scraping(Associated Press, 2014).  
A secondary discourse centers on whether the United States Congress 
should pass a national data-breach notification law. Such a law would require 
retailers and financial institutions to notify cardholders when a data breach has 
occurred. A federal data breach law would supersede the current patchwork of 




data-breach notification law several times over the past decade without success, 
but the recent focus on Target and Neiman Marcus may provide fresh support for 
such a law (Selyukh, 2014). 
What is absent in the flurry of press releases, Congressional hearings, 
and news interviews is a discussion of why United States retailers and financial 
institutions continue to suffer point-of-sale system compromises, despite a long 
and well publicized history of major breaches.  
D. SUBWAY – A CASE STUDY 
On May 04, 2011, a federal Grand Jury in New Hampshire indicted six 
individuals, including four Romanian nationals, for hacking into numerous point-
of-sale systems. According to the grand jury, the group of hackers broke into 
point-of-sale systems of over 150 Subway sandwich franchises and fifty other 
retailers (U.S. v. Oprea et al.). The hacking group ultimately compromised over 
100,000 cards, leading to more than $17.5 million in unauthorized charges and 
remediation expenses (DOJ, 2013). 
The grand jury alleged that the group of six hackers broke into Subway 
and other retail point-of-sale systems over a period of approximately three years, 
from April 2008 until March 2011. The grand jury identified the following typical 
sequence of events: 
1. The suspects scanned target systems looking for vulnerable remote 
desktop software (i.e., port scanning for standard ports used by common remote 
desktop software and services). 
2. The suspects breached the point-of-sale systems by using easy-to-
guess passwords or password-cracking tools against the remote desktop 
software. 
3. Once the hackers had access to the point-of-sale system, they installed 
a back-door (specified in the indictment as xp.exe). This tool allowed the 




4. The hackers installed a keylogger (not specifically identified in the 
indictment) that captured card track data. 
5. The hackers exfiltrated the stolen card track data to a series of “dump 
sites” (FTP servers) maintained by the hackers. 
6. From overseas locations, the hackers would transfer the stolen card 
data from the dump sites to a central file server controlled by the hackers. 
7. The hackers would “monetize” (i.e., profit) from the theft of stolen card 
data by either selling the card data in the criminal underground, or by making 
unauthorized charges against the compromised accounts. In some instances, 
“the members created phony plastic credit cards by using hardware and software 
devices (including magnetic stripe readers/writers) to encode blank plastic cards 
with the stolen credit card data. They then used these encoded plastic cards to 
make unauthorized charges with various merchants, primarily located throughout 
Europe (U.S. v. Oprea et al.).” 
Since the indictment, three of the six defendants have pled guilty and have 
been sentenced. Two unnamed suspects have yet to be identified, and one of 
the named suspects remains at large in Romania. 
The Subway case is not the largest in history, nor is it notable for any form 
of sophisticated malware or hacking techniques. In many ways, though, the 
Subway case is a classic model of criminal intrusions into point-of-sale systems. 
The attackers often begin by running a port scan against IP addresses that 
belong to restaurants and other retailers, looking for port numbers that 
correspond to remote desktop software or services such as PC Anywhere, 
Microsoft Remote Desktop, LogMeIn, or GoToMyPC. Remote access software 
(sometimes known as a remote desktop environment) is common on point-of-
sale systems to allow point-of-sale technicians (usually from the company that 
installed the point-of-sale system) to remotely log in and troubleshoot issues with 




products use common port numbers, and the point-of-sale merchants often 
establish common (de-facto default) user-name and password combinations 
(Trustwave, 2014). When the intruders find remote desktop ports open, they try 
easy to guess passwords, default passwords, or employ brute-force password 
cracking methods. Once inside the restaurant’s network, the attackers then 
employ a keystroke logger or memory scraper to capture card track data. The 
stolen data is then uploaded to an external file server, usually called a “dumps 
site,” where the criminals later aggregate and sort the card data by card type 
(Visa, MasterCard, American Express) and location of the issuing bank.  
It is worth noting that all of the named suspects, including the three that 
have pled guilty, are from overseas. Moreover, a portion of the fraud occurred in 
Europe. The Subway case is but a mere example of how cyber crime has 
rendered international borders less important, at least for the criminals that gain 
illegal access to retail establishments, compromise thousands or even millions of 
cards, then use these accounts to make fraudulent purchases or sell them on 
“dumps sites,” where anyone with Internet access can purchase credit or debit 
card data with which to make counterfeit cards. The transnational element of 
cybercrime, which is prevalent with point-of-sale breaches, presents a unique 
attack against the financial health of the United States. 
E. THE TRANSNATIONAL ELEMENT IN PAYMENT SYSTEM BREACHES 
On August 07, 2009, French police, using information provided by the 
United States Secret Service, arrested Vladimir Horohorin as he boarded a plane 
in Nice on his way back to Russia (DOJ, 2010). According to a Grand Jury 
indictment, Horohorin, also known as “BadB,” operated a fully automated “dumps 
site,” dumps.name. A “dumps site” is a Website devoted to the buying and selling 
of stolen card data (U.S. v. Horohorin). The United States Department of Justice 
declared that Horohorin ran one of the largest “dumps sites” in the world until his 




On his Website, Horohorin posted two animated videos glorifying the 
“carder” lifestyle. In his first video, a Russian and an Italian carder are shown 
enjoying the fruits of their criminal activities while various United States citizens 
discover that their account balances are empty (Zetter, 2010). In the second 
video, the Russian hacker is shown accepting a medal from Russian President 
Vladimir Putin. At the end of the second video, a statement in broken English 
reads, in part, “we awaiting for new dumps and new incomes, we awaiting you to 
fight the imperialism of USA. That way we invest U.S. funds in Russian economy 
and make it grow bigger! (BadB cartoon, n.d.)” 
It is impossible to measure the degree to which anti-American sentiment 
motivates Russian or other international hackers. There is no question, however, 
that proceeds from card breaches are changing the dynamics of the worldwide 
underground economy. In the past three years news organizations have 
published no fewer than three detailed reports about the Romanian town of 
Ramnicu Valcea, also known as “Hackerville.” According to these articles, 
proceeds from online fraud and hacking have brought sudden and suspicious 
wealth to a previously poor city of 100,000 citizens (Bhattacharjee, 2011; Bran, 
2013; Odobescu, 2014). 
 It is impossible to determine the exact involvement and extent of foreign 
criminals in the world of payment system intrusions and fraud. Not all data 
breaches are reported to law enforcement, and even in the cases that law 
enforcement investigates, only a small portion of the suspects are identified, let 
alone prosecuted. Furthermore, payment system breaches generally involve 
three types of criminal activity: 
1. The illegal network or system intrusion into the point of sale system or 
payment system, which leads to theft of credit and debit card numbers, expiration 
dates, and in some cases PIN codes and personal information. 
2. The trafficking of numbers of credit and debit cards. Most of the buying 




Websites variously called “dumps sites,” “carding portals,” or “carding forums.” 
Some of the more infamous of these were and are Shadow Crew, Carderplanet, 
Carder.su, and Mazafaka.ru. In general the criminals that steal credit and debit 
card numbers sell stolen card data to these “carding” or “dumps” sites. While the 
criminals will often keep a portion of stolen card data for their own personal use, 
they sell the vast majority to “carding” sites.  
3. The street use of stolen credit and debit card numbers. While the first 
two kinds of criminals can and often do use compromised card data for their own 
fraudulent purchases, a large portion of the criminal proceeds occurs by selling 
data to street-level criminals. For credit-card information, the end-user criminals 
will make fraudulent purchases online or re-encode the compromised information 
onto counterfeit credit cards to use in person at stores, hotels, etc. For debit-card 
information, criminals will make fraudulent purchases online, re-encode the data 
onto counterfeit cards to make in person fraudulent purchases, or use the 
counterfeit cards to make cash withdrawals at Automated Teller Machines 
(ATM), an activity known as a “cash out.” In some instances, a criminal 
organization will produce hundreds or thousands of counterfeit ATM cards, using 
stolen card data and PIN codes. The criminal organization will recruit “mules,” or 
accomplices who are willing to use the fraudulent cards at ATM machines around 
the world. Generally the “mules” keep a portion of the cash withdrawn, and send 
the remainder to the criminal organizers. 
The layered nature of payment system intrusions and subsequent card 
fraud means that even a relatively simple theft of credit and debit-card numbers 
from a small restaurant in Idaho may have connections to large scale 
transnational organized crime. Figure 2 illustrates a common layout for a 




















Figure 2.  Common Trans-national Criminal Underground “Carding” 
Hierarchy 
The Albert Gonzalez hacking organization provides a good illustration of 
the trans-national aspect of the criminal “carding” underground. Gonzalez was a 
hacker involved with the Shadow Crew organization, and later developed his own 
criminal enterprise. Unlike most carding operations, in which the “dumps” site 
administrator serves as a pure separator between stolen card sellers (i.e., the 
POS or other hackers) and buyers (i.e., the street users or “mules”), Gonzalez 
established and directed all layers of activities. The Gonzalez carding 
organization included individuals from several countries, thus illustrating the 
international aspect of the stolen card underground. Figure 3 shows the basic 
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Figure 3.  The Albert Gonzalez Carding Organization  
F. THE HOMELAND SECURITY CONNECTION 
The examples in the previous section illustrate that theft of card data from 
point-of-sale systems is truly an international problem. State and local law 
enforcement agencies are generally limited in their reach against these 
international crime rings, mainly due to jurisdictional restrictions, but also due to 
funding and other resource problems. State and local police departments can 
and do play a critical role in arresting the end users or “mules” of counterfeit 
credit, debit, and ATM cards. In fact, the dismantling of the Shadow Crew carding 
organization began largely when a New York City Police detective arrested Albert 
Gonzalez in the act of “cashing out,” or using counterfeit ATM cards encoded 



































Furthermore, the significant number of compromised card accounts, 
coupled with billions of dollars in fraud losses and other expenses, poses a 
serious threat to the health of the United States economy, and is therefore a 
homeland security problem. Table 1 shows a list of some of the major card 
breaches in recent U.S. history Krebs, 2013; FBI, 2009; US v. Gonzalez, 2010; 
Cratty, 2012; Pepitone, 2014). These breaches alone yielded hackers almost 270 
million credit and debit card numbers, with an estimated fraud loss of almost 
$135 billion.  
Table 1.    Payment Card and Fraud Losses for Major Breaches 
Victim Number of Payment 
Cards Compromised 
Estimated Fraud Loss 
Target Stores 40 million $20 billion* 
RBS World Pay N/A $9 million 
Hannaford Grocery 4.2 million $2 million  
DSW (online shoe store) 1 million $500 million* 
Dave & Buster’s 240,000 $3 million 
TJ Maxx/Marshall’s 94 million $47 billion* 
Heartland Payment 
Systems 
130 million $65 billion* 
* Exact fraud loss amounts not available; figures derived from the number of 
payment cards compromised with an average fraud loss of $500, per the United 
States Sentencing Commission 
 
Criminals obtain the majority of their stolen card numbers by hacking into 
point-of-sale systems. In fact, of the three largest card data breaches in U.S. 
history, two were the result of point-of-sale compromises (US v. Gonzalez, 2008; 








Table 2.   Three Largest Payment-card Breaches and Primary 
Method of Compromise 
Victim Primary Method of Compromise 
 
TJ Maxx/Marshall’s Point-of-sale system compromised via 
cracked WEP keys on 802.11 wireless 
system 
Heartland Payment System 
 
SQL Injection against Website 
Target Stores 
 
Point-of-sale system compromised 
after hackers broke into a trusted third 
party system and made their way to 
Target’s point-of-sale system 
 
While criminals do obtain stolen card data through various hacking 
methods, including SQL injection, the majority of compromised accounts and the 
majority of individual intrusions involve attacks against retail point-of-sale 
systems. As point-of-sale systems yield the greatest fraud losses and therefore 
impact on the U.S. economy, any efforts toward mitigating the homeland security 
problem of trans-national carding organizations must begin with reducing the 




IV. A SURVEY OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS OF POINT-OF-
SALE SYSTEM INTRUSIONS 
A. NATURE AND PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
To gain insight into the mechanics of criminal point-of-sale intrusions, we 
conducted forty-two criminal investigations of point-of-sale breaches by the 
United States Secret Service. We reviewed all point-of-sale cases opened from 
January 2013 through January 2014. In general, Secret Service agents begin a 
point-of-sale investigation following one of two conditions: 
 A bank or other financial institution notifies a Secret Service field 
office that a retail establishment appears to be a “common point of 
compromise.” When fraudulent purchases appear on a legitimate 
cardholder’s account, financial institute fraud investigators look for 
common locations where the legitimate cardholder used the 
payment card. For example, if Mom’s Bank received complaints of 
fraudulent purchases from twelve different customers, and all 
twelve made a purchase at Dad’s Café, then Dad’s Café is the 
common point of compromise, and the nearest Secret Service 
office to Dad’s café will dispatch an agent to investigate. Based on 
results of our research, this is the most common method. 
 Secret Service agents investigating criminal carding organizations 
will learn about a specific point-of-sale breach through confidential 
informants or undercover methods. 
For our research, we read investigative and forensic reports related to point-of-
sale investigations. For each case, we sent a survey to the lead investigative 
agent to gather specific information about the nature of the intrusion. 
 We attempted to gather the following information: 
 What was the specific manner of intrusion into the point-of-sale 
system? 
 What was the duration of the compromise? 
 How many cards were compromised, or what was the fraud loss as 
a result of the intrusion? 
 Did the attackers use malicious code, and if so, what type of code 




How did the victims (i.e., the businesses who used the point-of-sale 
system) learn of the intrusion? 
We collected the data with the following larger questions in mind: 
 Are there recurring types of malicious code used with point-of-sale 
system intrusions? 
 How prevalent are zero-day malicious code infections? 
 What is the average duration of a point-of-sale compromise? 
 What is the average fraud loss or number of cards compromised? 
 What are the primary attack or infiltration methods?  
 How do the hackers exfiltrate stolen card data from compromised 
point-of-sale systems? 
B. SURVEY METHODS 
We identified forty-two new cases concerning point-of-sale system 
intrusions for the period of January 2013 through January 2014 by reviewing all 
network-intrusion investigations by the Secret Service specifically focused on 
point-of-sale systems. We sent a survey to the case agent in charge of each of 
the forty-two point-of-sale system investigations. Of the forty-two surveys we 
submitted, we received responses from forty-one. The survey included seven 
questions related to the nature of the point-of-sale system compromise, including 
length of intrusion, method of intrusion, method of card exfiltration, and the 
method by which the intrusion was discovered.  
C. RESULTS 
The table in the appendix summarizes each case. In some instances, 
specific data was not provided such as duration of the intrusion or specific 
malicious code used due to one of the following: 
 The business owner or point-of-sale system vendor may have 
performed a system clean-up or completely rebuilt the system 
before law enforcement or third-party forensic vendors had an 




 During the investigation the case agent (i.e., the Secret Service 
agent leading the criminal investigation) presented a summary of 
the case, including fraud loss, identities of suspects, etc., to a 
federal prosecutor. If the federal prosecutor declined to prosecute, 
the Secret Service ceased any further investigation or forensic 
analysis. 
 In a small number of cases the business owner may have hired a 
private forensic firm to conduct a private investigation and 
implement security improvements. The third-party analyses do not 
always address the specific research questions we pursued. 
 Some investigations were in the early phases and complete data 
was not yet available 
The table in the appendix provides a summary of each criminal 
investigation undertaken by the United States Secret Service of point-of-sale 
system intrusions from January 2013 through January 2014. The table reveals 
some interesting statistical trends: 
 The most common entry point into point-of-sale systems was 
through poorly secured remote-desktop environments. Other 
security risks were having no firewall, having missing or out-of-date 
anti-virus protection, and using point-of-sale system terminals for 
personal Internet activities. 
 The most common form of malicious code was Perfect Keylogger 
for hard-disk-based keystroke loggers, and the “sr.exe” and 
“searcher.dll” pair for random-access memory-based “scrapers.” A 
“memory scraper” or “RAM scraper” is malicious code that monitors 
specific point-of-sale processes in random-access memory to catch 
payment-card data when it is temporarily unencrypted as it transits 
certain processes in memory (Kotov, 2014). 
 In most cases, banks or other financial institutions identified the 
victim business by recognizing the “common point of compromise.”  
 In some instances victims were identified through other Secret 
Service investigations. For example, a Secret Service agent may 
arrest a suspect in a point-of-sale intrusion case who admits to 
hacking into other, unreported point-of-sale systems. 






 For cases where the duration of the intrusion is known, its average 
length was 6.3 months. 
 The total number of stolen cards identified to date is 2,498,956 for 
forty-two criminal cases. If we use the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
standard fraud loss per card of $500.00, then the potential fraud 
loss for these forty-two investigations alone is $1.2 billion. The 
number of compromised cards will likely grow as financial 
institutions complete their assessments. 
This survey revealed that point-of-sale system intrusions were not 
sophisticated, because they did not need to be. In most cases, hackers breach 
the point-of-sale system by scanning for standard port numbers associated with 
remote desktop environment products or services. Then the hacker generally 




V. FORENSIC INDICATORS OF POINT OF SALE SYSTEM 
ATTACKS 
A. POINT-OF-SALE SYSTEM ATTACK CHARACTERISTICS 
Point-of-sale system intrusion methods reflect the gamut of the larger 
world of network intrusions and include a mix of physical attacks, Web-based 
attacks, and network attacks. A brief survey of some of the largest point-of-sale 
system intrusions illustrates this spectrum (Berg, Freeman, & Schneider, 2008; 
Krebs, 2011; Krebs, 2014, February 06; US v. Gonzalez, 2009): 
Table 3: Intrusion Methods for Major Point-of-sale Intrusions 
Victim  Initial method of intrusion 
TJ Maxx chain Cracked WEP Wi-Fi password 
Michael’s Craft Stores Physical tampering of POS terminals 
Target Department Store chain Compromised 3rd party credentials 
Hannaford Supermarket chain SQL Injection 
  
While criminals apply a variety of methods against larger retail 
corporations, they more often attack smaller retail establishments by focusing on 
remote-desktop (remote-access) connections. The statistical data collected in 
Chapter IV show that out of thirty cases with a known or suspected method of 
compromise, sixteen involved remote desktop software. In a white paper for the 
2010 Black Hat USA conference, researchers from the security and forensics 
company Trustwave called exploitation of point-of-sale remote access “the easy 
way” (Percoco and Ilyas, 2010). Trustwave’s 2013 Global Security Report 
identified remote desktop exploitation as the cause of 47% of all network 
intrusions that company investigated (Trustwave, 2013). 
Many small and medium-size retail establishments use simple remote-
access software (e.g., PC Anywhere, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, or Microsoft Remote 




access the system at any time. If a bar or restaurant experiences point-of-sale 
system troubles during a busy Saturday night, the establishment wants the 
system fixed immediately, and the point-of-sale technician wants to avoid a 
possibly long drive to the restaurant. Thus, there is sound business logic for 
remote access. Criminals have learned, however, that many businesses use 
remote-access products with weak passwords. Therefore, criminals merely need 
to run a port-scan tool such as Nmap against potential point-of-sale IP 
addresses, looking for standard port numbers for remote access products. For 
example, Microsoft’s Remote Desktop Protocol runs on TCP port 3389, and PC 
Anywhere operates on TCP port 5631 or 5632. Once an attacker has collected a 
list of potential targets, the attacker can try a list of common login names and 
passwords. In some cases, point-of-sale system components were left 
configured with standard login name and password combinations (e.g., user 
name “aloha,” password “aloha”), which exacerbated the problem (Trustwave, 
2014). 
Once criminals have entered the point-of-sale network, they usually install 
malicious code designed to capture payment-card data. In general, this malicious 
code is either traditional keylogger software (e.g., Perfect Keylogger) or random-
access memory (RAM) scrapers. Keylogging software monitors input sources 
such as keyboards and card readers. Keylogging software such as Perfect 
Keylogger collects captured card data into a log file. The criminals may retrieve 
the log file manually (using the original intrusion method, often a poorly-secured 
remote-access application) or establish a file transfer protocol (FTP) or simple 
mail transfer protocol (SMTP) service to exfiltrate data from the compromised 
system. Attackers can configure the SMTP or FTP service to periodically export a 
payment-card log file to an external server or Web mail account. 
Malware scrapers are currently the more common method of capturing 
card track data (Trustwave & USSS, 2012). When an employee swipes a card, 




encrypts it. Memory scrapers monitor specific buffers in memory known to be 
associated with specific point-of-sale processes. When the malicious code 
identifies new payment-card data, it is copied to a log file on the hard drive of the 
infected point-of-sale machine. Depending on the specific memory scraper tool 
being used, the scraper may perform additional actions on the collected data, 
such as parsing and encryption. Criminals can then retrieve the collected card 
data manually, repeating the initial intrusion methods (Trustwave, 2014). 
B. A FORENSIC CASE STUDY 
In a typical point-of-sale system implementation, employees swipe cards 
at one or more point-of-sale terminals. The track data is sent to a buffer in 
memory, either on the terminals themselves or at the back-of-house server 
(Trustwave, 2014; Trustwave, 2010). The point-of-sale system software reads 
the card data from the memory buffer and encrypts the cardholder data before it 
is sent to a financial institution for approval. Memory scrapers target cardholder 
data in the brief instant that it is unencrypted in the memory buffer.  
To provide insight into potential forensic evidence from a criminal 
compromise of a point-of-sale system, we examined a back-of-house server from 
a victim restaurant. The compromised machine ran Microsoft Windows XP 
Service Pack 2 and a standard copy of Aloha Manager/EDC point-of-sale 
software, along with a copy of Symantec’s PCAnywhere to support remote 
access. The built-in Windows firewall was disabled, as were Windows Automatic 
Updates for system security patches. 
For this server, we performed the following forensic steps: 
1. We began with a “clean” Universal Serial Bus thumb drive. The 
drive was formatted with the NTFS file system to eliminate possible storage 
problems (e.g., file size and file name length) with the FAT 32 file system. 
2. On the thumb drive we installed a “known good” copy of cmd.exe 




3. We added a copy of the tool “Dumpit” from Moonsols to collect a 
copy of the target system’s random access memory (RAM). As a backup tool, we 
added a copy of Access Data’s FTK Imager Lite. 
4. On the live (compromised) system, we inserted the thumb drive. 
After it mounted, we navigated to the drive letter of the thumb drive and ran the 
program cmd.exe. 
5. At the Windows Command Line Interface (CLI), we collected 
volatile and system information via the following commands: 
 F:\ ipconfig /all >>collection.txt 
 F:\ natstat –ano >>collection.txt 
 F:\ whoami >>collection.txt 
 F:\ systeminfo >>collection.txt 
 F:\ net user >>collection.txt 
 F:\net accounts >>collection.txt 
 F:\openfiles >>collection.txt 
 F:\taskist /v >>collection.txt 
 F:\wmic process list full >>collection.txt 
 F:\net start >>collection.txt 
 F:\tasklist /svc >>collection.txt 
 F:\schtasks >>collection.txt 
 F:\wmic startup list full >>collection.txt 




The last command collected the system-identification value for the current 
logged-on user. This information is necessary to manually copy the user’s 
ntuser.dat file. 
6. We ran the tool Dumpit from Moonsols from the command line, 
which copied the contents of the live system’s random-access memory into a 
dump file in the .raw format. 
7. We manually copied the Windows Registry hive files with: 
 F:\ reg save HKLM\SAM f:\regsamdump 
 F:\ reg save HKLM\SYSTEM f:\regsystemdump 
 F:\ reg save HKLM\SECURITY f:\regsecuritydump 
 F:\ reg save HKLM\SOFTWARE f:\regsoftwaredump 
 F:\ reg save hku\{user’s SID value} f:\ntuserdump.dat 
8. We manually copied the Windows Event Logs using “copy *.wev 
f:\.” 
9. We analyzed the gathered information with a variety of forensic 
tools, including: 
 Bulk Data Extractor : Used for parsing useful strings (e.g., 
email addresses, Internet Protocol addresses) out of source, such 
as our memory dump file 
 Strings : Used for pulling clear text strings out of a source, 
including formatted files 
 Redline : Used for analyzing running processes and looking for 
indications of malicious code and rootkit infections 
 RegRipper :  Used to parse data from Windows Registry 
hives, including installed software, mounted hardware, entries in 




 Volatility : Used to extract specific information such as data on 
running processes from memory-dump files. Volatility is built on a 
modular framework, which allows an examiner to choose specific 
plug-ins.  
 YARU : Used for exploring imported Windows Registry hives 
in the native directory structure 
 Event Log Explorer : Used for importing Windows Event 
Logs. Although the native Windows Event Viewer works well for this 
task, the Event Log Explorer tool offers more export options and 
can concatenate multiple Windows event logs into one file. 
In the case of the compromised back-of-house server, forensic analysis 
revealed that criminals installed a three-part memory scraper tool on the server. 
The loader (controller) file rpcsrv.exe appears on a security alert of point-of-sale 
malicious code published by Visa, Inc. in 2009 (Visa, 2009), though the other 
files were not recognized. 
The loader functioned as the malicious-code installer. It added a service 
for persistence, pointing to itself, and also loaded the other two files, one for 
parsing card strings in memory, and the other for data aggregation. After running 
the Strings tool against this file, the output revealed the two files this controller 
file was set to begin: 
start /min algsvc.exe 
start /min rdpsvc.exe 
The second component was the actual memory-scraper tool. Memory 
scrapers are generally written to monitor specific point-of-sale executable files 
that process card track data. In the case of the infected back-of-house server, 
this machine ran Aloha’s EDC (Electronic Draft Capture) software for processing 




Aloha process (edcsvr.exe) in memory for credit card strings. An analysis of the 
memory scraper with the Strings tool shows specific references to edcsvr.exe. 
The third component was a data-aggregation tool, rdpsvc.exe. It 
monitored data collected from the memory scraper and parsed card data. This 
data was then obfuscated and sent to dump files, which the criminals would 
retrieve manually. 
C. SAMPLE FORENSIC INDICATORS OF POINT-OF-SALE SYSTEM 
INTRUSIONS 
Non-volatile evidence may be collected via several techniques, including 
full disk-drive imaging with a write-blocking mechanism and imaging software, or 
through the collection of specific files or directories. In some instances an 
establishment is unable or unwilling to take its point-of-sale system offline for 
traditional disk imaging in which case non-volatile information can be collected 
directly from the machine. 
Nonvolatile evidence includes persistent malicious code, Windows 
Registry keys, cache files, and log files. Malicious code in the form of keyloggers, 
especially common applications like Perfect Keylogger, will likely generate 
positive hits with anti-virus products. Point-of-sale specific malicious code may 
not be included in standard anti-virus signature lists, but Web resources do 
provide MD5 checksum values and Windows Registry key values for some 
malware scrapers (Visa, 2009; Trustwave, 2010; iSight, 2014; Wilson, Loftus, & 
Bing, 2013; Higgins, 2014). 
For example, the security research company iSight published a list of non-
volatile forensic indicators for the Kaptoxa point-of-sale malicious code set, which 
many believe was used in the Target department store intrusion (iSight, 2014; 
Krebs, January 2014). This list includes additions and modifications of fifteen 
Windows Registry keys (e.g., HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\ 




present in a Kaptoxa-infected point-of-sale system including name, extension, 
size, and four different hash values for each malicious file. 
Volatile evidence is obtained by deploying specific data collection  
tools on the live machine. Although the use of these tools on a live device will 
leave evidence that an examiner used such tools (for example, in the  
Windows Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ 
Explorer\RunMRU) (Carvey, 2011), most live-response collection tools and 
methods leave a minimal footprint. 
Volatile evidence may include running processes (hidden or open), 
suspicious network ports, volatile Windows Registry key values, temporary files, 
and memory-only malicious-code activity. Examiners may have prior information 
that enables them to focus on certain suspicious network ports or running 
processes. For the case study of the server, we know that the controller file 
loaded the memory-scraper program (algsvc.exe) and the card data parsing and 
aggregation program (rdpsvc.exe), both of which ran as normal (i.e., non-hidden) 
processes. 
Network evidence can be useful to learn how stolen data exited the 
impacted network, as well as its destination. In some instances, for example 
zero-day exploits or highly stealthy techniques, network forensics may be the 
best option for discovering the outbound export of sensitive data. Indeed, when 
Google fell victim to an Advanced Persistent Threat (also known as an Operation 
Aurora attack) intrusion in 2010, Google’s incident-response team relied on 
Domain Name Service logs to piece together the nature of the attack (Westervelt, 
2010). 
Network forensic evidence is also useful in an investigation, and can come 
from log files (Domain Name Service, mail, Web, Dynamic Host Configuration 
Protocol, etc.) or by capturing network packets in real time. For the latter, the 
investigator can use a small network tap, a span port on a network switch, or a 




require installation of new software which may violate the principle of making as 
few changes to the original evidence as possible. Capturing network packets in 
real time can be challenging, as the resulting capture files can grow very quickly. 
Nevertheless, running packet capture tools on traffic of a suspected infected 
machine may be the best option for determining the methods and destinations of 
outbound compromised data. As an example, the Arbor SERT revealed the 
following signatures from the recent Dexter point-of-sale malicious code (Wilson, 
Loftus, & Bing, 2013): 
 GET /hint/chck.php HTTP/1.1 
 Host: rome0[.]biz 
 Accept: text/html, */* 
 Accept-Encoding: identity 











VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PREVENTING  
POINT-OF-SALE INTRUSIONS 
A. TECHNICAL SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Information gathered from criminal investigations of point-of-sale system 
intrusions and from trend reports from Trustwave demonstrate that criminals 
often use predictable patterns of attack behavior along with easily identifiable 
malicious code. Poorly secured remote access is perhaps the most common 
entry method for criminals, and we recommend that retailers pay particularly 
close attention to improving it. 
1. Secure remote access capabilities 
If remote access between point-of-sale vendor technicians and the point-
of-sale system is a necessary evil, then the point-of-sale system operators must 
operate it as securely as possible. We offer the following recommendations: 
A. Avoid if possible remote-access products and services such as 
PCAnywhere, GoToMyPC, Microsoft RDP, LogMeIn, etc. Point-of-sale system 
operators can install an effective yet inexpensive hardware firewall with virtual 
private networking capabilities, such as the Cisco ASA 5510, sold by a variety of 
vendors for under $400. 
B. If commercial remote access products are unavoidable, point-of-sale 
operators (i.e., the restaurant, hotel, or store) should establish good passwords 
necessary to access the system. Do not allow point-of-sale system vendors to 
establish user names and passwords. Users should follow best practices for 
length, expiration, and complexity. Users can check the strength of a given 
password from a variety of password checking Web sites, including 
www.passwordmeter.com. 
C. If commercial remote-access products are unavoidable, point-of-sale 




needed. If an off-site employee or point-of-sale technician requires remote 
access, require that they call in to request its enablement. Point-of-sale operators 
should be able to disable the remote-access product when not in use by 
suspension or shut-off functions within the application, or by stopping the running 
process at the command line or within Windows Task Manager. 
2. Use an effective anti-virus product 
Anti-virus products may not be effective against some types of malicious 
code that only attacks point-of-sale systems (Trustwave, 2014). Nevertheless, 
anti-virus products are still effective in identifying popular keystroke logging tools, 
such as Perfect Keylogger. Point-of-sale system users should use an anti-virus 
product, configure it to receive automatic updates, and run automatic scans. 
3. Use a firewall 
In addition to using a hardware firewall to protect the point-of-sale 
system’s network, operators should use a software firewall on each terminal and 
the back-of-house server. These add an additional layer of security and another 
opportunity for log file activity. Microsoft Windows includes a built-in firewall with 
the Windows operating system.  
4. Restrict point-of-sale nodes to specific business use 
Point-of-sale system operators should forbid employees from using point-
of-sale system terminals and back-of-house servers for other Internet activities 
such as visiting Web sites, checking e-mail, etc. All nodes on the point-of-sale 
system should be restricted to the business functions of processing sales and 
card information to limit opportunities for malicious access. 
5. Operate point-of-sale system nodes with least privileges 
Operations of point-of-sale terminals and back-of-house servers should 
use minimal privileges (i.e., non-administrative accounts). Operators should 




information security best practices for password use (length, expiration, 
complexity). 
6. Harden the operating system of point-of-sale system nodes 
Point-of-sale system operators should strengthen the security of the 
underlying operating systems of point-of-sale nodes. They should consider 
security configuration guides from the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology. Specific suggestions include enabling automatic updates and 
disabling unnecessary applications and services. 
B. A POINT-OF-SALE-SYSTEM SECURITY AWARENESS CAMPAIGN 
Several organizations have published advisories and security 
configuration checklists for point-of-sale terminals. For example, in January 2014 
the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) published 
a two-page document, “Malware Targeting Point of Sale Systems” (US-CERT, 
2014). This advisory provides a brief overview of point-of-sale systems, the 
nature of point-of-sale system compromises, and a brief bulleted list of 
recommended security steps. Visa released a slightly more technical report, 
“Retail Merchants Targeted by Memory-Parsing Malware–Update” (Visa, 2014). 
This document provides a more specific two-page list of point-of-sale system 
security steps, but Visa also includes without explanation a two-page list of point-
of-sale system malicious code file names and MD5 hash values. Although this 
information is very helpful to investigators, it is doubtful that most small and 
medium size point-of-sale operators will know what to do with MD5 hash values. 
The Department of Homeland Security can help lead a public awareness 
campaign for the improvement of point-of-sale system security. This program 
clearly meets two key objectives of the Department, as specified in the 
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report (DHS, 2010): (1) prevent cyber 





As a precedent, the United States Secret Service, a component of the 
Department of Homeland Security, has for several years managed a successful 
international public awareness campaign concerning genuine currency. This 
awareness campaign uses a multi-level approach to public education, ranging 
from colorful flyers and posters for general information to detailed Web sites, 
seminars, and brochures for banks, retailers, and others who handle large 
amounts of currency. A point-of-sale security public awareness campaign could 
follow a similar layered approach. The first layer can feature easy-to-follow flyers, 
posters, and brochures that illustrate basic elements of point-of-sale system 
security. These items should use graphics and catchy phrases that will capture 
the attention of average point-of-sale system users. Middle layers can provide 
more specific “checklist” style steps toward improving point-of-sale system 
security, most likely in document format. Advanced layers can provide more 
technical security improvement procedures, including specific steps for different 





Summary of United States Secret Service point-of-sale system intrusion 
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Sr.exe; searcher.dll Bank(s) A 1 
month 
 
6 Unknown Sqlmgmt.exe; Rptsvc32.exe; 
sppt32.exe 
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11 Unknown Unspecified RAM dumper Bank(s) A 14 
months 
 
12 Unknown Unspecified Trojan (hidden 
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“Sr.exe” and “Searcher.dll” Bank(s) Unknown 27 
months 
 
20  Survey not returned     
21 Weak 
passwords 
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2 Keyloggers: “hkcmd.exe” 
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37 Unknown Zero day or custom 
keylogger 
TBD TBD 4 
months 
 
38 Unknown “Alghlp.exe”; “Ntmpsvc.exe”; 
“Mcservice.exe” 
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“Zbot” (aka Zeus Trojan); 
“Alina” virus (RAM scraper) 




Note that some entries with “unknown” data are recent cases in which 
forensic or investigative data may be forthcoming. In others, a federal prosecutor 
declined further consideration of the case, causing law enforcement to cease 
forensic and investigative activities. 
“Vulnerable RDE” means the victim used a default installation of a popular 
remote desktop environment, usually PC Anywhere, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, or 
Microsoft Remote Desktop. In some cases the victim (business) was not aware 
of the presence of the remote desktop environment; in many cases the remote 
desktop environment used weak passwords. 
 
Key for “Fraud Loss or Number of Payment Cards Stolen” column: 
 
A – Fewer than 10,000 payment cards stolen 
B – 10,001 – 25,000 payment cards stolen 
C – More than 25,000 payment cards stolen 
D – Fraud loss less than $50,000 
E – Fraud loss between $50,000 and $250,000 
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